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Abstract
This paper discusses the relation of new sensor technology on bridge resource management as
pertaining to the integration of new information sources and types for ship navigation in a
future e-Navigation environment.
An overview of several new technologies will be provided showing how systems and devices
currently available in the commercial marketplace are being adapted and used to aid ship
navigation planning and decision making. Examples include live Doppler radar useful for
coastal navigation available from land-based sources through broadband Internet connections,
imagery from unmanned aerial vehicles to aid in ice-navigation in, and forward-looking sonar
for navigating in poorly charted, uncharted and other world regions where aids to navigation
are not readily available. The use of such innovative methods are not yet covered in IMO
Guidelines, as e.g., for Voyage Planning, the Procedures Manual of a ship’s Safety
Management System or any other document to illustrate the adoption of such technology, but
needs to be considered and investigated.
However, the implications of introducing such new information sources in terms of bridge
watchstander (Officer of the Watch - OOW) workload and training are discussed with respect
to existing guidelines and regulations. Further illustration is provided in the context of how
such new information sources may be integrated with existing resources to enhance overall
navigation situational awareness. This includes the information itself as well as the means and
methods used to interact with the OOW in terms of bridge displays, monitors and alarms.
Selected specific details of research efforts currently underway will be provided in terms of
forward-looking sonar integration into the bridge environment and navigation processes. This
will include results obtained from experimental studies in the laboratory as well as on a
suitably equipped research vessel test bed. A description of achievements accomplished to
date will be provided in terms of tasks performed; the processes and procedures employed to
acquire, manage and evaluate these tasks; preliminary results and outcomes achieved; and
metrics used to measure these outcomes in terms of determining whether the research goals
are achievable. Comparisons between expectations and actual results will be discussed, along
with an analysis of risks encountered. Lessons learned are documented regarding errors in
input, process, product and/or metrics.
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INTRODUCTION

An important aspect of basic and enhanced training in ship handling and navigation courses is
the familiarization with and handling of equipment including transferring knowledge and
experience on the capabilities, functionalities and constraints on their use. Bridge navigational
equipment encompasses many and diverse systems to support safe and efficient navigation
and protection of the marine environment. The present situation is characterized by an
increasing level of integration of sensors, technical systems, displays and sophisticated
decision support systems combined with complex alerts to ensure sufficient situational
awareness of the bridge team. However, despite the presence of such sophisticated systems
accidents in the form of groundings and collisions still happen. Regardless of the behaviour,
the actions taken or not taken by the bridge team, the grounding of Costa Concordia equipped
with very modern integrated bridge navigational systems can be seen as another prominent
case where alerts implemented in most modern and highly sophisticated navigation systems
failed to raise the attention to take action to avoid an accident.
The COLREGs and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) require an adequate watch be maintained.[1,2] However,
there is presently no established means to maintain watch below the waterline to directly
detect the presence of hazards to navigation. A key assertion of the research presented in this
paper is that bridge watchstanders are generally provided only with indirect and/or secondary
information from which safety-critical decisions are routinely formulated. Although the tragic
grounding of Costa Concordia or more recently the grounding of M/V Marco Polo in
Norwegian fjords provide convenient and fresh examples to illustrate this assertion, the
problem has and continues to exist on a daily basis during virtually every vessel transit. For
example, nautical charts and even most modern ECDIS provide navigation information as a
secondary reference created by survey at some time in the past that was accurate at the time it
was made but not necessarily reflecting actual conditions at the time of passage. Radar
indicates only those nearby targets from which the proximity to underwater hazards to
navigation should be deduced. A traditional echo sounder provides depth directly below the
keel, but no indication of depth directly forward of the bow. These and other methods such as
GNSS merely infer positional relationships to geographic locations of interest and concern,
but none are capable of directly detecting the physical underwater hazard to navigation
(HtoN) consisting of Scole Rocks off Isle del Giglio, or any other such hazard prior to
grounding. Additional to this, there are floating hazards to navigation that cannot be charted
such as drifting shipping containers, debris fields, whales, etc., having little or no presence on
radar or other navigation sensors.
Another assertion is that the technology needed to detect hazards to navigation in real time at
and below the waterline currently exists in the form of FL-sonar and is available as
commercial off-the-shelf equipment ready to be installed on vessels at the next scheduled
drydocking. This does not imply, however, that this technology is sufficiently tested, capable
of being integrated directly into existing navigation systems in its present form, or adequate
training exists for its use. Merely adding yet another sensor and display system to an already
complex bridge environment without adequate engineering, planning and training is likely to
make matters worse rather than improving them, resulting in increased risks to navigation.
2

This is illustrated with the introduction of radar that lead to the radar-assisted collision
between M/Vs Stockholm and Andrea Doria. Lack of proper training in the operation, use and
interpretation of radar equipment combined with a lack of procedures for implementing
corrective actions based upon radar indications created a scenario where established
procedures for navigating in restricted visibility were not followed, resulting in the
collision.[3]
The capabilities and limitations of forward-looking sonar technology are discussed in terms of
their scope and capability to detect hazards to navigation, along with its suitability in terms of
vessel type, speed and installation requirements. Also covered is the complexity of using FLsonar for vessel navigation describing present capabilities as well as future requirements in
terms of standards for integrated navigation systems (INS) and bridge alerts. This includes the
introduction of electronic aids to navigation (eATONs) as a means to display hazards to
navigation on electronic chart display and information systems (ECDIS). Integral to this
process is the use of simulation technologies to test, verify and validate system processes,
procedures and training requirements well in advance of the introduction of this technology to
vessels by the introduction of carriage requirements through the IMO.
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FORWARD-LOOKING SONAR TECHNOLOGY

Active sonar, commonly referred to as an echo sounder by the IMO, is used by vessels in
determining the depth between the keel and the bottom.[4] A variation of the echo sounder is
forward-looking sonar used to detect bottom features and objects within the water column
forward of the bow. Despite its usefulness and the availability of this technology in the
commercial marketplace it is rarely included within the ships’ complement of navigation
sensors.

2.1

SPECIFICATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

The methods used for detecting bottom features, objects and soundings by determining range,
azimuth and elevation information can generally be described as variations on transmitting a
steerable sonar signal ahead along the path of the vessel or transmitting a single ping from
which snapshots of the environment are obtained.[5-8] A mosaic of the bottom topography
and specific targets is then created as the vessel progresses on its course.
The range of FL-sonar can extend from eight to twenty times the depth ahead, depending on
bottom and target conditions. It is most effective when the bottom topography slopes upwards
and when targets are large and consist of hard rock and/or coral that provide good acoustic
signatures. FL-sonar products are available that provide both 2-as well as 3-dimensional
representations which provide a more realistic portrayal of the course ahead.
FL-sonar systems have been developed with different capabilities supporting both
autonomous underwater vehicle and vessel applications. Of those designed for use on vessels,
most are intended for pleasure and small fishing boats. There are systems with range and
resolution that make them suitable for use on larger vessels such as workboats, offshore
service vessels, merchant and passenger vessels. However, operational constraints may create
limitations on their usefulness. For example, effective range may be limited by tradeoffs in
transducer design to minimize water resistance and drag. A summary and examples of several
3

FL-sonar systems, presently available on the market and each utilizing a different type of
transducer, and their specifications are given in Table 1.
Table 1 – Comparison between forward-looking sonar systems

2.2

BASIC APPROACH TO ESTIMATES OF ADVANCE FLS-WARNINGS

As a very first basic step for establishing and further development of definitive parameters for
the issuance of warnings to watchstanders using FL-sonar, certain guiding principles may be
cited to achieve an estimate useful for broad guidance on the subject. For example, a
calculation of the relative time afforded a vessel to begin corrective action such as altering
course, reducing speed or otherwise reacting to an alarm generated by a FL-sonar would be
based, at minimum, upon the following factors:
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑠𝑒𝑐) =

𝑀𝐷𝑅 (m) − 𝑆𝑅𝑅 (sec) − 𝐴𝑃𝑇(sec) − WRT(sec)
m
𝑉s ( )
sec

(1)

where logical arguments may be made to establish values for each of these parameters:
Speed of Vessel (Vs) =
10 knots
Screen Refresh Rate (SRR) =2 sec, or as noted
Maximum Detection Range (MDR) =
obtained from Table 1
Alarm Processing Time (APT) =
4 sec
Watchstander Response Time (WRT) =
5 sec
1 m/s =
1.9438 knots
Although some systems can perform at much higher speeds, a value of 10 knots was selected
for the Speed of Vessel (Vs) to provide a common basis for evaluating the reaction time to
FL-sonar system alarms. A value of two seconds for Screen Refresh Rate (SRR) on the
display was assumed based upon system performance specifications. However, SRR for the
Furuno CH-270 system may be as high as eight seconds or more as this system provides
general coverage that extends beyond the area directly ahead of the bow. The value for
Maximum Detection Range (MDR) is obtained from the performance specifications of the
individual FL-sonar units.
Alarm Processing Time (APT) is the speed at which FL-sonar data can be evaluated by signal
processing and alarm generation algorithms to determine whether a condition exists that
breaches predetermined vessel-specific safety contours and depths. This includes draft,
4

course, manoeuvring capabilities, lateral clearance margins and other factors pertinent to
safety of navigation. As assumption is made that such criteria for FL-sonar are likely to be
similar to those established by IMO for ECDIS.[12] Integral to this factor are time delays to
prevent normal operating conditions from causing false alerts because of normal transients
that may exist in the FL-sonar data.[13] This can add an additional one to several seconds to
ensure target persistence, eliminating the generation of an alarm due to a single occurrence or
short duration or transient target. A value of four seconds was selected based upon FL-sonar
refresh rates as well as estimates of processing times for interface and communications
systems handling software that may be required by INS.
Watchstander Response Time (WRT) is that needed for the OOW to acknowledge an alert
and take appropriate corrective action based upon the nature of the alarm. This must take into
account time lags necessary to assess rates of change in processes such as changing vessel
course against targets’ movements.[14] The time required for the OOW to confer with other
bridge watchstanders and lookouts and to issue orders to the helmsman must also be factored
into this calculation. Add to this the effects of fatigue and various other human factor
elements, one can easily see that this factor is the most subjective and imprecise in the
equation. A value of five seconds was chosen in part based upon the author’s direct
observations of bridge practices used on several vessels under similar conditions using ECDIS
and radar indications.
Using these criteria the EchoPilot 3D FL-sonar provided approximately ½-minute warning,
the Furuno CH-270 provided approximately 2¼-minute warning and the FarSounder 1000
provided approximately a 3-minute warning when considering their maximum detection
range. The speed of 10 knots may appear somewhat slow for most vessels while underway.
However, if a vessel is operating in unknown, poorly charted or known-hazardous waters it is
prudent to increase safety margins by proceeding at a slower than normal pace.
It should be noted that such advance warning calculations generally provide “best case”
scenarios under ideal conditions, and that actual conditions and response times must be
expected to reduce these margins – significantly in some cases. Actual conditions must also
take into consideration both human and technological factors that can result in major
deviations from these response times. Technological factors can include water turbidity, poor
acoustic reflection qualities of potential HtoN and even growth on the hull that may reduce
FL-sonar sensitivity. Human factors can range widely from distractions on the bridge,
unfamiliarity with the equipment and general lack of training, proficiency or currency in
watchkeeping procedures.

2.3

INSTALLATIONS

To achieve the most reliable and accurate performance FL-sonar transducer(s) must be
located on an area of the hull that is free of turbulence from obstructions located forward of
the mounting position. Each transducer must be provided an unobstructed view both
horizontally towards the bow and vertically from the waterline to the bottom to achieve the
best accuracy and effectiveness.
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The EchoPilot 3D Forward Looking Sonar uses two transducers mounted athwartships, one
either side equidistant to the keel - ideally on the rear third of the vessel. The interior
installation of these transducers as visualized from within the hull is illustrated in Figure 1a.
The FarSounder 1000 Navigation Sonar uses one transducer mounted on the bow with a
fairing tube inserted within an existing or standard bulb, or as a separate installation. The
exterior installation of this transducer as seen from ahead of the bow is shown in Figure 1b.

Transducers

Figure 1: FL-Sonar Transducer Installations (1a. Dual EchoPilot Transducers Mounted Athwartships (left) and b.
Single FarSounder Bow-Mounted Transducers (centre and right)

The Furuno Searchlight Sonar, Model CH-270 (not pictured) uses a single transducer that can be
lowered from and retracted into the hull at speeds above 10 knots. This unit may be mounted
anywhere on the vessel where an unobstructed view horizontally through 360° is available.
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INTEGRATED FLS BRIDGE ALERTS

The information available from the FL-sonar can be useful in alerting watchstanders as to
potential HtoN present in the path directly ahead of the bow. Visual indications seen on the
FL-sonar display are one form of alerting mechanism. However, this data may also be shared
as part of an integrated approach using ECDIS as well as the Alert management, module C of
an INS according to latest IMO Performance Standards. This, moreover, coincides with
existing STCW training requirements and could utilize existing alarm mechanisms with which
watchstanders are already familiar.

Figure 2: Forward-Looking Sonar Alarm Volume Setting
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The capability to provide those warnings and alarms can be even independent of operator
interpretation and be based upon analysis of the information obtained from the FL-sonar. This
appears to be available only from the FarSounder system. Taking into account the
characteristics of the sea area (e.g. approaching coastal waters, navigating in ice etc.) the
operator can configure parameters within the area being observed by setting alarm values by
depth, minimum range, maximum range, and field-of-view angle width as illustrated in Figure
2.[19] The alarm volume is shown in red. An additional setting is the number of hits detected
before triggering the alarm.
Figure 3 below shows an example of FLS information integrated as an ECIDS overlay. For
this prototype HMI of integrated of FLS information, the three major requirements valid for
display of radar information in ECDIS are applied with respect to the new technology.

Figure 3: FL-Sonar ENC Overlay

Taking the potentials of FLS technology and results from first experimental implementations
it is concluded that watchstanders are provided both visual and audible notifications e.g.
announced via the centralized CAM-HMI and supported by presentation in FL-sonar target
overlay in an ECDIS as suggested in the figure 3.
Furthermore, analysis of information available from FL-sonar can be used to trigger alerts
with different levels of priority. In accordance with the definitions provided by IMO
performance standards the lowest level of such an alert is a caution to just raise awareness of
the bridge team to a certain unusual situation. In respect to the integrated use of FL-sonar
information this could be a situation, where an obstacle is detected at a larger distance ahead,
e.g. due to a cross track error.
Triggering a warning, the second priority level of alert and requiring immediate attention by
the bridge team, could be linked to criteria within the usual manoeuvring range of the ship to
avoid contact to any detected HtoN. The time frame is to be configured as to allow the OOW
to additionally check the FL-sonar display but also match witch available ECDIS information
(e.g. to proof approaching a shallow waters area, a wreck or rock, island).
7

Finally even an alarm could be triggered, characterizing conditions requiring immediate
action e.g. the ship is approaching the lower manoeuvring limit (e.g. an emergency, hard
rudder action would be required) in order to avoid the contact with an FL-sonar detected
object/HtoN. This last stage of an alert could be connected to the actual ship status and the
ship's actual manoeuvring capabilities. That information can be provided by dynamic
predictions of the ship's future path for an emergency evasive manoeuvre and check of the
predicted track, for instance, against the available water depth.

4

FLS INFORMATION AND WARNINGS – A CASE STUDY

For the purposes of visualisation and discussion of FLS based warnings simulation of the
circumstances encountered in during a real grounding accident is used as a hypothetical case.
Data are taken from official accident investigation report [15] and simulation is attempted
through extraction of the ground track using the AIS data record, then overlaying FarSounder
1000 FL-sonar cone coverage onto the ground track to identify key events that may have
provided opportunities to enhance situational awareness. Four noteworthy positions in the
transit just prior to grounding identified as A, B, C and D are illustrated in Figure 4 and
recorded into the above chronology.

Figure 4: Ground Track of Costa Concordia, Annotated with Coverage for Forward-Looking Sonar Navigation
(Source: Marine Casualties Investigative Body, Cruise Ship Costa Concordia, Report on the safety technical
investigation, p. 61, Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports (Italy).

Ground Track Position A (10°56’32” E, 42°20’41” N; Speed: 15.3 knots; Course 325°)
This position lies approximately 1,600 meters from Scole Rocks with depth in excess of 100
meters with a mud bottom.[16] This location is outside the range of FL-sonar to detect bottom
information and is not likely to have provided any information of significance to navigation.
Segment A to B (Elapsed Time: 00:01:08, Rate of Yaw: 11°/min)
During most of this segment the bottom depth would have remained in excess of 100 meters
with a mud bottom. However, just prior to arriving at Position B the maximum range of the
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FL-sonar would have crossed the 100 meter bottom depth contour directly ahead and to port
of the centreline and it is possible that early indications of an upslope bottom may have been
able to be detected. Note that during this segment the rate of turn is approximately 11 degrees
per minute.
Ground Track Position B (10°56’15” E, 42°20’52” N; Speed 15.6 knots; Course 335°)
This position lies approximately 1,100 meters from Scole Rocks with depth in excess of 100
meters with a mud bottom. The 100 meter bottom contour is approximately 500 meters further
along the course, with upslope bottom rising to the 10 meter bottom contour at the maximum
range of the FL-sonar off the starboard bow. The bottom is also transitioning from mud to
rock, with a resultant increase in acoustic reflectivity of the bottom material.
Clear indications of the approaches to Scole Rocks would have appeared on the starboard bow
on the FL-sonar display. This probably would have initially alerted the Master to the existence
of a problem since the appearance of Scole Rocks would have been expected off the port bow
based upon his passage planning.[17] Furthermore, the depth contour displayed on the FLsonar would clearly indicate insufficient depth in an unexpected location.
Segment B to C (Elapsed Time: 00:01:04, Rate of Yaw: 10°/min)
During this segment bottom depth is steadily decreasing across the range of the FL-sonar
from in excess of 100 meters to the surface. The bottom consistency also changes from mud
to solid rock, resulting in a large acoustic reflection and indications of strong targets.
The appearance of a solid wall leading up to the surface and continuously decreasing in
distance would have loomed prominently on the FL-sonar until it consumed two-thirds of the
display from far port to starboard of centre. Despite orders from the master to turn from 330°
to 350° throughout the one minute segment duration, the rate of turn appears to have been half
that at 10 degrees per minute.
Ground Track Position C (10°56’01” E , 42°21’05” N; Speed 16.0 knots; Course 340°?)
This position lies approximately 530 meters from Scole Rocks with depth of 95 meters just
past the 100 meter contour with a rock bottom. The bottom contour would reflect an upslope
bottom rising to the surface around 500 meters ahead. Less than one-third of the display off
the starboard bow would show clear water. There would be very little room to manoeuvre at
this point.
Segment C to D (Elapsed Time: 00:01:03)
This is the terminal segment of the voyage. Bottom consistency is solid rock resulting in a
large acoustic reflection and indications of strong targets. The appearance of a solid wall
leading up to the surface and continuously decreasing in distance would have continued up to
the point of impact.
Ground Track Position D (10°55’40” E, 42°21’21” N; Speed 15.3 knots; Course )
This position lies approximately 30 meters from Scole Rocks with twelve seconds remaining
before contact.
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Hypothetic course of events - Applying FL-Sonar
Using a speed of 16 knots obtained from the chronology in paragraph 4.1 as the value for
Speed of Vessel (Vs) in equation (1), FL-sonar could have provided approximately 1.8
minutes advance warning to the Master of Costa Concordia of the pending HtoN consisting of
the approaches to Scole Rocks. The warning would have been issued when the vessel was just
past position B shown in Figure 4.
Had FL-sonar been installed and operational on the bridge as discrete navigational equipment
without benefit of inclusion within INS, visual indications would have shown an
unmistakable wall directly in the path of the vessel. Existing alarms available both integral
and external to the equipment would have also been activated, further reinforcing the severity
of the situation. Consistently, at all noted positions on the final approach (Figure 2: positions
A through D) the FL-sonar would have indicated clear water was present off the starboard
bow.
It is assumed that the 1.8 minutes prior warning would have provided sufficient advance
notice to plan and execute evasive manoeuvres that may have lessened the severity of the
grounding or averted it entirely. Halting the forward momentum of the vessel would not have
been possible as this would require around 1,300 meters with the vessel moving at 16 knots,
and this distance was not available.[18] However, slowing the vessel combined with
executing a hard turn to starboard upon receiving the warning commencing approximately
800 meters prior to Scole Rocks would have significantly reduced the damage incurred in the
event of grounding such that the vessel may have remained afloat and lives may have been
saved. Indeed, and even hypothetical, the accident may not have happened at all.

5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Vessel groundings and collisions with HtoN can and do cause untold suffering, loss of life
and property, often resulting in devastating environmental damage. Costs incurred as a result
must include property and liabilities arising from the accident itself as well as the cleanup.
Such costs escalate as vessels increase in size and cargo capacity, especially for cargos that
include toxic chemicals. Larger passenger vessels with greater carrying capacity create even
greater risk. The effects of such accidents are amplified in areas that are remote where search
and rescue and salvage efforts are problematic at best.
FL-sonar can provide a means to directly detect HtoN that are not present on navigation charts
as well as supplement existing methods to effect greater urgency to adverse circumstances and
heighten situational awareness. The technical capabilities exist to make a substantial
difference now. The establishment of carriage requirements as well as fusion into INS still
needs to take place. The costs involved are minimal, especially in light of the consequences of
not having FL-sonar available for navigational use. The salvage cost of Costa Concordia
amounts to over $2 billion US [20]. This amount by itself would cover the costs to purchase
and install FL-sonar equipment on 75% of the world’s merchant fleet greater than 25,000
gross tons [21].
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